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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a haven for free expression. Not only are content-
based restrictions disfavored, but "[the internet] provides relatively
unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds."' Almost
half of all Americans have listened to music online, whether rebroadcasts
of terrestrial radio or to find niche music that terrestrial radio simply
does not play, and 13 percent tune in regularly.2 Webcasters provide a
unique outlet for new artists; however, if royalty rates are set too high for
all but the largest webcasters to stay in business, the variety of music
available will be severely restricted.3 Musical diversity stimulates the
generation of new music and ideas; the mass media concentration and
conformity of music may have the opposite effect, by encouraging po-
litically mainstream messages and censoring out those which are not.'
Increasing royalties to the point of putting most webcasters out of busi-
ness would work to destroy one of the last readily accessible sources of
alternative, non-mainstream music. In response to the current state of
affairs regarding royalties, I suggest that a new rate-setting model is
needed for webcasters and propose a new structure.
II. How WEBCASTING WORKS
Webcasters use a technology known as "streaming" to send music to
their listeners. While the listener hears a performance that is virtually
indistinguishable from terrestrial AM/FM radio, webcasters send time-
and location-sensitive streams to individual recipients. The listener's
computer receives these streams, and then reassembles them back to-
gether by using a "player."5 To compensate for differences in stream
I. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869-70 (1997).
2. Edison Research, The Infinite Dial 2008: Radio's Digital Platforms-AM/FM,
Online, Satellite, HD Radio, and Podcasting, Presentation of National Survey on Digital Ra-
dio Platforms (2008), available at http://www.edisonresearch.com/Infinite%2ODial%202008
_Presentation.pdf.
3. See Webcasters Unite with Artists for Live National Concert Webcast to Save Inter-
net Radio as Fed Debate Grows, BNET Bus. NETWORK, July 2002, http://findarticles.con/p/
articles/mi-pwwi/is_2002071ai-mark03044425.
4. See generally William Osboume, Marketplace of Ideas: But First the Bill: A Per-
sonal Commentary on American and European Cultural Financing, ARTSJOURNAL.COM, Mar.
1I, 2004, http:llwww.artsjoumal.comartswatch/20040311-11320.shtml ("Mass media pop is
thus distinguished by its ability to create a ready, packaged (and often benign) form of social
criticism that raises protest only within the strictures the mass media will accept.").
5. In re Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephem-
eral Records, Report of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel, No. 2000-9 CARP DTRA
1& 2, at 3 n.3 (2002), available at http:l/www.copyright.govlcarplwebcasting-rates.pdf [here-
inafter CARP Decision].
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transmission speeds, the player collects and reconstructs the first several
seconds of the song in a "buffer,' a form of temporary RAM storage.
Once a sufficient number of streams have been collected by the user's
computer, the song starts to play while the computer continues to receive
additional streams until they too are performed. Once the song is fin-
ished playing, the buffer is emptied and the listener's computer generally
does not retain a copy.6 In contrast to downloaded music, streams are
designed to be used once and then discarded .
The pre-1995 Copyright Act allowed an individual to hold a copy-
right in either a "musical work," the notes and lyrics of a song, or a
"sound recording," a particular rendition of a song.8 The Copyright Act
gave five rights to the owner of a copyrighted musical work: reproduc-
tion, derivative works based on the original work, distribution of copies
to the public, public performance, and public display or transmission.!
Public performance, one of these five rights, involves the performance of
a work in a public place or broadcasts to multiple locations through tele-
vision, radio, or the Internet.' °
The licensing of these public performance rights is one of the neces-
sary steps to making music available over the radio or internet.
"Virtually all of the licensing of performance rights in musical composi-
tions is handled by three performing rights organizations ("PROs"): the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP");
Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"); and the Society of European Stage Au-
thors & Composers ("SESAC")."' Each of these PROs controls a
different proportion of the market: ASCAP (54 percent), BMI (43 per-
cent), or SESAC (three percent).' 2 PROs serve as central clearinghouses
for bulk performance licensing through a "blanket license," which "enti-
tles a licensee to perform the entire repertoire of a PRO's songs (or some
pre-set subgroup of songs) throughout the term of the license."' 3 Gener-
ally, radio and television stations pay about two percent of adjusted gross
income for this license; for other businesses, a flat annual fee is
charged.'
4
6. W. Jonathan Cardi, Uber-Middlenan: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music
Copyright, 92 IowA L. REV. 835, 860-61 (2007).
7. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 3 n.3.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 4-5.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
10. Daniel A. Tysver, Rights Granted Under Copyright Law, BITLAW, http:I/
www.bitlaw.com/copyright/scope.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
11. Cardi, supra note 6, at 841.
12. See id. at 843-44.
13. Id. at 845.
14. Id. at 845-46.
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Most copyrights to sound recordings are held by five major record
labels, which own about 80 percent of the licenses: Universal Music
Group, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Brothers Music, BMG Enter-
tainment, and EMI Group.15 The Recording Industry Association of
American (RIAA) is composed of these five major labels, as well as
some smaller labels.' 6 RIAA serves a coordinating role for the labels on
enforcement actions, congressional lobbying, and assistance in intra-
industry negotiations.'7
Webcasters use ephemeral recordings to enable or facilitate the
transmission of sound recordings. A single ephemeral copy is allowed to
be made without charge, but it is often necessary to make multiple
ephemeral copies to facilitate streaming at different bit-rates and codecs.
The creation or use of multiple ephemeral copies is currently subject to a
compulsory license.'8
III. WEBCASTING REGULATORY HISTORY
A. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
(DPRSRA) amended the Copyright Act to grant the copyright owners of
sound recordings the exclusive right to license the "perform[ance] [of]
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion."' 9 However, two exceptions were carved out of this exclusive right:
the Section 114(d)(1) limited public performance right and the Section
114(d)(2) compulsory license (also known as a statutory license).20 All
other services needed to individually negotiate royalty rates with
the copyright holders of sound recordings. In creating these rights, Con-
gress tried to balance the interests of copyright holders of sound
recordings with the countervailing interests of the radio broadcasters,
PROs, and music publishers.2'
15. Id. at 848.
16. Id. at 848-49.
17. See id. at 849.
18. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Records, 72 Fed.
Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
19. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 6 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006)).
20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(l), (d)(2) (2006). The statutory license is compulsory because
the user of the copyrighted work need not get individual permission from the copyright holder;
their permission is automatically given if the user complies the requirements of the statute. See
CONG. RESEARCH SERv. REP. FOR CONG., H.R. 1417: THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY AND DISTRI-
BUTION REFORM AcT OF 2004 (Dec. 16, 2004).
21. See Cardi, supra note 6, at 849-50.
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These three categories of DPRSRA broadcasters are each subject to
different licensing requirements. First, non-subscription broadcasters,
which included FCC-licensed terrestrial radio stations (AM/FM), are
subject to the Section 114(d)(1) limited public performance right.22
These broadcasters are completely exempt from paying royalties to the
owners of sound recordings for the performance of their works.23
Second, under the Section 114(d)(2) compulsory license, non-
24interactive subscription transmissions must comply with the statutory
conditions set by a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) and
adopted by the Librarian of Congress and to avoid the need to individu-
ally negotiate royalties with individual copyright holders.25 The statutory
licenses included restrictions on the number of songs by a single artist or
on a single album that could be played per hour and a prohibition on
26publishing an advance playlist of specific songs.
Third, interactive services enable a listener to receive, on request, a
particular sound recording. While call-in radio stations are not covered
by this definition, a website which provides a list of songs available to be
played immediately at the request of the user would be deemed interac-
tive. 27 These services must pay individually-negotiated royalties to
28owners of both sound recording and musical work copyrights.
Section 115 provides a "compulsory license to distribute or author-
ize the distribution of a phonorecord of a nondramatic musical work by
means of a digital transmission ....,,29 However, this Section 115 com-
pulsory license applies only to the musical work; separate permission is
required to obtain the Section 114 license.30 This initial division of the
two rights appears inefficient and influenced much more by the actual
copyright holders than the copyright users.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6) (2006) (defining an "eligible non-subscription transmis-
sion").
23. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(l) (2006).
24. This was the group into which webcasters, like Pandora, were eventually placed.
See infra Part III.B.
25. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 7.
26. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, 109 Stat. 336, 337, 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(d)(2) (1995).
27. See Cardi, supra note 6, at 851.
28. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUMMARY, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
OF 1998 at 16 (Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.govlegislation/dmca.pdf.
29. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
§ 4, 109 Stat. 336; see also 17 U.S.C. § I1 5(a)(1) ("any other person ... may, by complying
with the provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phon-
orecords of the work").
30. See Jenna Hentoff, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Works in the Digital Age: Why
the Current Process is Ineffective & How Congress is Attempting to Fix It, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L.
113, 120 (2008). This note is addressing only the section 114 consequences of musical copy-
right; not section 115.
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Because webcasters were not specifically included in the DRPSRA
revisions, webcasters and the recording industry fought over whether
webcasters should qualify for the limited public performance right or be
treated as an interactive service and thus be required to individually ne-
gotiate royalties with owners of copyrights in sound recordings.'
Congress resolved this dispute when it enacted the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.
B. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) addressed royalty
payments for webcasters under Section 114.32 The DMCA adopted the
statutory license for two types of webcasting: "preexisting subscription
services" and "eligible non-subscription services."33 These two categories
included terrestrial radio stations' online rebroadcasts as well as pure
webcasters, but excluded providers who allowed users to download or
select music of their choice.34 To set royalty rates, the DMCA provided
for voluntary negotiations between parties.35 However, if voluntary nego-
tiations failed to succeed within the 60-day statutory period, the DMCA
adopted DPRSA's CARP procedures to set rates and terms for the com-
pulsory license. After the CARP's three ad-hoc professional arbitrators
made their decision, it was submitted to the Librarian of Congress, and
subject to appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.36 The rates and
terms set by the CARP were to distinguish among the different types of
services and the degree to which the use of the service increased or de-
creased the purchases of physical phonorecords (CDs, tapes) by
consumers. CARP was to "establish rates and terms that most clearly
represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the
marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller."
3 7
Under the DMCA, compulsory license holders were allowed to
make no more than one ephemeral record, which was only for non-
31. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 8.
32. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, tit. IV, 112 Stat. 2860,
2887-2906 (1998).
33. CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT FOR CONG., STATUTORY ROYALTY RATES FOR
DIGITAL PERFORMANCE OF SOUND RECORDINGS: DECISION OF THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY
BOARD, I IOTH CONG. (2007) (statement of Robin Jeweler, Legislative Attorney, American
Law Division).
34. See Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Revolution Is Ready to Begin, as Soon as
We Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 15-16 (2001).
35. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, § 405(2), 112 Stat. at 2895-96.
36. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT FOR CONG., H.R. 1417: THE COPYRIGHT
ROYALTY AND DISTRIBUTION REFORM ACT OF 2004 at 2 (Mar. 18, 2004).
37. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, § 405(2), 112 Stat. at 2895-96.
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commercial use and needed to be destroyed within six months.38 How-
ever, most webcasters must have several ephemeral copies of each song
in order to facilitate streaming at different speeds.39 The rates and terms
for the creation and use of multiple ephemeral copies were to be negoti-
ated through voluntary negotiations and agreements, or under terms set
by a CARP under the same procedures as webcasting rate-setting. 4
C. The Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel's 2002 Decision
The February 2002 Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP)
recommendation set retroactive royalty rates for webcasters for the
October 1998 through December 2000 period, and rates for the January
2001 through December 2002 period. 4' Following the guidelines set by
the DMCA, CARP acted because voluntary negotiations between the
copyright holders and the webcasters had failed.
After it considered the various models suggested for calculating roy-
alties, CARP adopted RIAA's proposal for a per performance royalty
model (as opposed to the webcaster-supported percentage-of-revenue
model) for three reasons. First, a per performance model represented
what was actually being licensed (as well as accounting for partially
played songs resulting from a "skip song" feature), while a revenue
model merely worked as a proxy for the music actually played.42 Second,
it was very complex to identify revenue attributed to music streaming,
particularly when webcasters offer features other than music.43 Third,
since many webcasters generate little revenue, a revenue model would
force copyright owners "to allow extensive use of their property with
little or no compensation," which was contrary to Congress' intent when
enacting the DMCA. 44
To determine the rates that would have been negotiated in the mar-
ketplace under the per performance model, CARP reviewed actual
royalty agreements to comply with its statutory obligations under the
DMCA.45 It found that the RIAA/Yahoo! agreement provided an appro-
priate benchmark for the rate-setting because it was the only RIAA-
negotiated agreement "to reflect a truly arms-length bargaining process
38. Id. at 2899-2900.
39. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 96.
40. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, § 405(2), 112 Stat. at 2900.
41. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 2.
42. Id. at 37.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, § 405(2), 112 Stat. at 2896.
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on a level playing field between two major players of comparable skill,
size, and economic power.
'46
The Yahoo! agreement was negotiated under the shadow of a com-
pulsory license and CARP proceedings, which the RIAA had wished to
avoid. Instead, the RIAA had hoped that its negotiations with Yahoo!
would motivate other webcasters to sign agreements with it and skip
CARP proceedings as well.4'8 The Yahoo! agreement set a rate of 0.2
cents per song for Intemet-only streaming, while retransmissions of ra-
dio broadcasts were set at a lower rate of 0.05 cents per song. 9 However,
CARP found that this Internet-only rate was inflated due to the lower
radio retransmission rate, but was offset somewhat by lower future arbi-
tration costs for Yahoo!. 0 This differentiated cost structure was designed
so that the RIAA could maintain a high benchmark for Internet-only
streaming rates and so that Yahoo! could get the lowest overall rate pos-
sible.5'
Weighing the evidence, CARP found that streaming music had, at
best, a minimally positive effect on sales of phonorecords; thus discount-
ing promotional effects as a significant factor in rate-setting.52 However,
it held that radio and radio retransmissions had a "tremendous promo-
tional impact" on sales. 3 Thus, the panel upwardly adjusted Yahoo!'s
Internet-only streaming music rate to 0.14 cents per performance and
downwardly adjusted radio retransmissions to 0.07 cents per perform-
ance. 4 "Listener-influenced stations," those which allowed users some
control over which songs they listen (through ratings of artists, albums,
or songs, or a skip feature), were eligible for the compulsory license, as
were syndicated programs." CARP realized that many webcasters did
not have the software and technical expertise to track individual per-
formances; thus, webcasters were allowed to temporarily calculate
royalties through aggregate tuning hours (ATH) instead.56
CARP set the rate for ephemeral copies at nine percent of the per-
formance royalties paid by a licensee. This number was based on a range
of 8.8 to 10 percent of the performance rate, with Yahoo! at 8.8 percent
46. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 60-61.
47. Id. at 45, 64.
48. Id. at 64.
49. Library of Congress Copyright Office, Determination of Reasonable Rates and
Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 FR.
45,240, 45,251, 2002 WL 1446448 (2002).
50. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 67-69.
51. Id. at65.
52. See id. at 33-34.
53. Id. at 74-75.
54. Id. at 77.
55. Id. at 78-81.
56. Id. at 109-10.
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and smaller webcasters having previously negotiated rates closer to 10
percent. Since Yahoo! was the largest and most powerful webcaster who
had negotiated with the RIAA, CARP took the Yahoo! rate and rounded
it up to nine percent, based on the higher rates that the RIAA had negoti-
ated for other voluntary license agreements . Additionally, CARP set a
$500 minimum fee to cover the administrative costs of the copyright
owners and access to the sound recordings, and for the use of multiple
ephemeral sound recording copies.58
D. Overruling the 2002 CARP Decision
Reactions to CARP's decision were negative, particularly from the
Internet and technology community. Many webcasters staged a "Day of
Silence" to protest the new fees and accounting procedures. 9 A typical
response was this: "CARP will kill internet radio. It's that simple. The
Day of Silence is practice for the grave."0 It was believed that the new
costs would eliminate many webcasters and significantly decrease the
variety of music available on the Internet. This rationale was in fact one
of the bases for CARP's decision: it found that the current webcasting
community had too many marginal or insignificant entities. Market con-
solidation through increased royalty rates was believed to be a positive
force, thus allowing the remaining webcasters could operate at sustain-
able rates.6'
CARP decisions are reviewable by the Librarian of Congress or by
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.62 "If the Librarian rejects it, he
must substitute his own determination 'after full examination of the re-
cord created in the arbitration proceeding.' If the Librarian accepts it, the
determination of the CARP becomes the determination of the Librar-
ian."63 In this case, the Librarian accepted CARP's decision that the
RIAA/Yahoo! agreement was the best evidence for an agreement that
would have been negotiated in a marketplace between willing buyers and
sellers. 64 However, the Librarian disagreed with CARP and found
that there was no basis for differentiating between royalty rates for
57. Id. at 100-04.
58. Id. at 95.
59. Doc Searls, Silent Mayday, LINUX J., May 1, 2002, http://www.linuxjournal.com/
article/6044.
60. Id.
61. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 52.
62. Library of Congress Copyright Office, Determination of Reasonable Rates and
Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 ER.
45,240, 45,242 (July 8, 2002) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261).
63. Id. (citations omitted). "In either case, through issuance of the Librarian's Order, it
is his decision that will be subject to review by the Court of Appeals." Id.
64. See id. at 45,247-48.
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Internet-only webcasters and webcasters who retransmitted radio broad-
casts and that CARP's decision to distinguish between them was
arbitrary.
The Librarian recalculated the range of acceptable rates for web-
casters (and radio retransmissions) and determined that an acceptable
rate was between 0.065 cents per performance65 and 0.083 cents per per-
formance.66 Since the Register had recommended a rate of 0.07 cents per
performance (the same rate charged for radio retransmissions under
CARP's decision), which was within the "zone of reasonableness," the
Librarian accepted the Register's recommendation. 6 7
The Librarian also upheld CARP's decision to charge webcasters a
per performance rate for ephemeral records.68 However, the Librarian
found that CARP should not have relied on the rates set in other volun-
tary agreements with the RIAA. 69 Thus, the Librarian set the ephemeral
rate at 8.8 percent, the same rate as the Yahoo! agreement. 70 The mini-
mum fee of $500 for the compulsory license and the right to create
ephemeral copies was deemed to be acceptable as well, since it was held
• 71
not to be arbitrary.
E. Beethoven.com Litigation
In response to the Librarian's decision, the RIAA, participant web-
casters, and non-participant webcasters sued for review. The court
found that the non-participant webcasters lacked standing because they
were not parties in the original rate-setting, and were not allowed to in-
tervene because the issues they raised were not sufficiently related to
• 71
those issues brought before the court by the other parties.
65. Id. at 45,255. Since the rates set in the Yahoo!/RIAA agreement were based on
radio retransmissions (90 percent of the total), and the remainder as internet-only transmis-
sions, the Librarian calculated the new rate as follows: (0.9 x 0.05 cents) + (0.1 x 0.2 cents) =
0.065 cents per performance. Id.
66. Id. This was the blended rate which Yahoo! actually paid for its first 1.5 billion
performances.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 45,261-62.
69. Yahoo! was chosen as the example for the hypothetical marketplace because "Ya-
hoo! was a DMCA-compliant Service; RIAA represented the interests of five independent
record companies, and the license granted the same rights as those offered under the webcast-
ing and the ephemeral recording licenses:" Id. at 45,245. All the other agreements failed to
meet these requirements, or lacked Yahoo!'s ability to negotiate on equal footing with RIAA
based on resources, sophistication, and market power. Id.
70. Id. at 45,262.
71. Id. at 45,262-63 (the rate-setting was held not to be arbitrary).
72. Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
73. Id. at 945-46.
Royalty Rate-Setting for Webcasters
Given that the standard of review for the Librarian's decision was
"exceptionally deferential," the Court found that the Librarian's choice
to give the RIAA/Yahoo! agreement significant weight in the rate-
settings was not arbitrary, nor was the determination of the minimum
fee.74 The challenge to the Librarian's decision not to differentiate be-
tween webcasters and radio rebroadcasters was not held to be arbitrary
either." Formal legal challenges were unsuccessful for all parties in-
volved in royalty rate-setting.
F. Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002
Congress passed H.R. 5469, the Small Webcaster Settlement Act, in
2002, which suspended the Librarian's decision for six months.76 The
Librarian's decision was suspended in order to let the Beethoven.com
litigation run its course, which Congress hoped would spur voluntary
negotiations between the webcasters and RIAA.77 It did not.
The Small Webcasters' Settlement Act set a fee schedule based on
percentage of revenue, as opposed to a per performance rate.8 As the
webcasters felt that the royalty rates set by the Librarian did not
represent a rate that would have been negotiated between a willing buyer
and seller, and also believed that the Librarian-set rates would have put
them out of business, this legislative compromise satisfied the
webcasters' objections. 79 The act also satisfied the recording industry
because it provided a percentage of the royalty fees to be sent directly to
the recording artists.80
74. Id. at 946-49, 951-52.
75. Id. at 953-54.
76. Small Webcaster Amendments Act of 2002, 148 CONG. REC. H7047 (2002) (state-
ment of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
77. Id. (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). Referring to the Beethoven.com litigation,
Representative Sensenbreener argued the following in favor of H.R. 5469:
Although a resolution to this dispute is legally in play, implementation of the deci-
sion by the Librarian takes effect on October 20 and is retroactive to 1998. Unless
Congress acts, some webcasters will shut down. This explains the point of H.R.
5469 as originally drafted: to suspend the implementation of the Librarian's deci-
sion for 6 months, effective October 20. This delay would ensure that all parties
would receive all of the judicial process to which they are entitled under the law be-
fore the rate took effect.
Id.
78. Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, § 2, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780,
2780 (2002).
79. See id.; see also 148 CONG. REC. H7047 (2002) (statement of Rep. Berman).
80. Id. (statement of Rep. Berman). Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act, the
royalty fees are divided in the following way: 50 percent to the copyright owner, 2.5 percent to
the non-featured musicians, 2.5 percent to the non-featured vocalists, and 45 percent to the
feature recording artist(s). Small Webcaster Settlement Act § 5(c), 116 Stat. at 2784.
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The terms of the act provided redress for both non-commercial web-
casters and small commercial webcasters. Royalty payments for
non-commercial webcasters were suspended through June 2003, and
receiving agents for small webcasters were allowed to delay payment
obligations through December 2002. Despite the initial enthusiasm of
the House to set specific rates,82 specific terms were not set and it was
the intent of the Congress that this act would not be precedential 3 Con-
gress delegated the ability to set an industry-wide rate to the collecting
agent (SoundExchange) for copyright holders and recording artists. 84
G. Establishment of the Copyright Royalty Board
After Congress' intervention into rate-setting under CARP, the rate-
setting process itself was reexamined and redesigned with the passage of
the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act (CRDRA) in 2004.
The statute replaced the three-person ad-hoc CARP adjudicators with
three full-time Copyright Royalty Judges who would make decisions
concerning "reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments" for com-
pulsory licenses.5
In determining the marketplace rate between a willing buyer and
seller, CRDRA's objectives were to "maximize the availability of crea-
tive works to the public," balance the interests of the copyright owner in
a fair return and the copyright user in a fair income, reflect the contribu-
tions of the copyright owner and user in the product available to the
public, and to minimize disruptions on the industry practices and struc-
86ture. All rates were to be established prospectively, rather than
retrospectively as under the DMCA-regime.8 ' The CRDRA also estab-
lished streamlined procedures for small claims (under $10,000) which
required a written statement, one response per opposing party, and no
filing fee.88 Appeals for all rulings go directly to the D.C. Circuit Court,8
skipping the Librarian of Congress.
81. Small Webcaster Settlement Act § 3, 116 Stat. at 2781.
82. See 148 CONG. REC. H7047 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2002) (statement of Rep. Berman).
83. See 148 CONG. REC. H8996 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Berman).
84. Id.
85. Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 § 3, 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(a)-
(b) (2004); ROBIN JEWELER, H.R. 1417: THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY AND DISTRIBUTION RE-
FORM AcT OF 2004 at 3-4 (Cong. Research Serv. Rep.) (2004).
86. Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act § 3.
87. 150 CONG. REC. H771 (2004) (statement of Rep. Berman).
88. Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act § 3.
89. Id. § 3.
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H. Copyright Royalty Board Decision
The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) issued its first post-CRDRA
decision in March 2007, effective May 1, 2007. The CRB determined
that the appropriate metric for the Section 114(f)(2) compulsory license
was a per performance rate for commercial webcasters and an annual flat
per-station rate for non-commercial webcasters up through a certain cap,
with a per performance rate for each additional hour. Ephemeral license
charges were included in the applicable compulsory license rates.90 The
CRB decided to use the per performance rate rather than the revenue-
based rates for reasons similar to those of CARP: (1) per performance
rates are directly tied to what is being licensed, (2) ease of measurement,
(3) difficulties in tying revenue fees to the value of the licensed rights,
(4) complexities in determining revenue from mixed format webcasters,
and (5) the basic notion that the more that licensed rights are used, the
more payments should increase in relation to use.91
The CRB set the per performance rates per year for commercial
webcasters at: 0.08 cents (2006), 0.11 cents (2007), 0.14 cents (2008),
0.18 cents (2009), and 0.19 cents (2010).92 These rates were based on a
benchmark market rate for interactive services, adjusted for differences
in interactivity. 93 CRB chose to use the interactive service rate for web-
casting because:
Both the markets have similar buyers and sellers and a similar
set for rights to be licensed (a blanket license in sound re-
cordings). Both markets are input markets and demand for these
inputs is driven by or derived from the ultimate consumer mar-
94kets in which these inputs are put to use.
The minimum fee of $500 per channel per year is based on SoundEx-
change's expected costs for administering the sound recording rights. 95
90. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Records, 72 Fed.
Reg. 24,084, 24,088 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
91. Id. at 24,087-90.
92. Id. at 24,096.
93. Id. at 24,092.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 24,096-97. SoundExchange was originally an unincorporated, non-profit
division of the RIAA. In negotiations between parties, SoundExchange was designated as the
receiving agent for all royalty payments and was also tasked with distributing royalties to
copyright holders. Id. at 24,102. This arrangement was recognized by the CRB in a later deci-
sion. Id. at 24,105 ("In sum, the Copyright Royalty Judges determine that SoundExchange
will best serve the interests of all copyright owners and performers whose works are subject to
the statutory licenses and, therefore, shall be the Collective for the 2006-2010 royalty pe-
riod.") SoundExchange continues as the sole collective agent today. See SoundExchange,
About, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
Fall 2008]
280 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:267
Non-commercial webcasters are non-profit organizations, which
provide educational, cultural, religious program not generally available
from commercial webcasters, and tend to have different sources of
funding than commercial webcasters-listener donations, corporate
underwriting or sponsorships, or university funding.96 Non-commercial
webcaster royalty rates were distinguished by size-webcasters with an
average of fewer than 159,140 Aggregate Tuning Hours per month were
subject only to a $500 minimum fee per channel per year to pay for
SoundExchange administrative costs. 97 Larger non-commercial webcasters
were subject to the same rate structure as commercial webcasters.98 The
CRB found that music programming on larger non-commercial stations
competes with similar music program on commercial stations; thus it
should be subject to the same rate structure. 99
Unlike the huge dispute over the value of ephemeral copies in the
CARP decision, the CRB found that the record indicated that ephemeral
copies had no value separate from the performance of the sound re-
cording itself. Since the expiration of the CARP decision, no voluntary
negotiations had managed to secure a separate rate for the Section 112
license. Thus, the CRB ascribed no particular percentage of the sound
recording royalty rate to ephemeral licenses. '°°
The ruling provoked objections from webcasters. However, the CRB
denied all requests for a rehearing, holding that the determination was
not erroneous, without evidentiary support, or contrary to law.'°' How-
ever, the CRB did grant a transitional two-year stay (for 2006-2007) for
webcasters to use aggregate tuning hours to determine rates instead of
the per performance metric. Like the SWSA, this was merely a tempo-
rary relief and not to be used indefinitely in the future.
I. Reactions of Webcasters and Critics
In the aftermath of the CRB decision, many webcasters expressed
anger and despair. There was a widespread belief that most webcasters
would be unable to continue at a sustainable rate, since these royalties
represented at ten-fold increase in payments. Smaller webcasters, like
Bill Goldsmith from Radio Paradise, were facing bills of up to 125 per-
96. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Records, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 24,098.
97. Id. at 24,100.
98. Id. at 24,099-24,100.
99. Id. at 24,098-24,100.
100. Id. at 24,102.
101. In re Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings,
CRB DTRA No. 2005-1 (U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges Apr. 16, 2007) (issuing order deny-
ing motion rehearing).
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cent of their yearly income, an unsustainable cost.'' Hypothetically, lar-
ger webcasters like Pandora, a webcaster which offers thousands of
channels without subscription fees, could have a royalty bill of $2 billion
just for one year.103
The reason why most webcasters will be unlikely to meet their roy-
alty burdens is as follows: based on a webcaster playing an average of 16
songs per hour, royalties are 1.28 cents per listener-hour (based on 2006
rates). A well-run webcaster might have sold two radio advertising spots
at a profit of 0.6 cents per listener-hour. In addition to video gateway
ads, banner ads, and other web-based advertising, the total revenue for a
well-run webcaster is still only between 1.0 and 1.2 cents per listener-
hour. Thus, if a webcaster (and this is a well-run webcaster) must pay
1.28 cents per listener-hour, it is likely to go out of business.1 4 While
webcasters have the option of turning to subscription-based systems, this
could make them uncompetitive since most webcasters stream for free.' °5
Alternatively, webcasters could significantly change their format,
thereby justifying subscriptions, but would then run the not insignificant
chance of losing their audience.
While weeding out unsustainable webcasters might comport with the
rationale for CARP's decision,' °6 because more sustainable webcasters
will be able to pay the increased royalty rates set by the CRB, it is
unlikely to occur. Instead, some industry experts warn that if regulated
webcasters are driven off the web, listeners are likely to turn to illegal
services, which pay no royalties, or those which operate from overseas.107
In either case, copyright owners and musicians will be worse off. The
CEO of AccuRadio speculated that, "the people actually running the mu-
sic labels [don't want] to see internet radio shut down ... [but the
SoundExchange lawyers] were more successful than they expected to
be." 08
In protest to the CRB rate hikes, webcasters launched a National
Day of Silence on June 26, 2006. The event included everyone from
102. See Eliot Van Buskirk, Royalty Hike Panics Webcasters, WIRED, Mar. 6, 2007,
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2007/03/72879.
103. Id.
104. See Daniel McSwain, Webcast Royalty Rate Decision Announced, RAIN: RADIO
AND INTERNET NEWSLET-rER, Mar. 2, 2007, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/
030207/index.shtml.
105. See, e.g., Pandora, www.pandora.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
106. CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 52. See also supra Part llI.D.
107. See Buskirk, supra note 102. Although overseas webcasters can block US-based IP
addresses, they are unlikely to be able to bar all American users. For example, when Pandora
banned all non-US users from its site in order to comply with CRB rules, users found a way to
get around it. See, e.g., OpenPandora, http://openpandora.blogspot.com (last visited Feb. 28,
2009).
108. See Buskirk, supra note 102.
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small webcasters to major webcasters in an attempt to draw national at-
tempt to the royalty mess, similar to the 2002 Day of Silence protesting
the CARP decision.'
J. Motion for CRB Rehearing Denied
For the section 114(f)(2) compulsory license, things remain unset-
tled. On March 26, 2007, a group of webcasters filed a motion for a CRB
rehearing. Challenged issues included the $500 minimum fee per stream,
the ability of webcasters to calculate per performance fees, and the deci-
sion not exempt a class of very small broadcasters which would pay
royalties on an percentage-of-revenue basis."0 On April 16, 2007, the
CRB denied the motion for a rehearing."' The CRB held that, as there
was no new evidence available, and no arguments had been made to cor-
rect a clear error or prevent manifest unjustice, a rehearing was denied."2
Additionally, a stay pending administrative appeals and judicial review
was denied."3 However, the CRB made a clarification to its March 2007
decision by permitting royalties to be paid on an aggregate tuning hours
(ATH) option to 2006 and 2007, with rates of 1.23 cents and 1.69 cents
for music webcasters in those years."'
On April 23, 2007, CRB filed its Final Determination of Rates and
Terms." 5 The Board adopted the two-year ATH option for 2006 and
2007, and delayed payment due dates of "45 days after the last day of
the month in which Copyright Royalty Judges issue their final determi-
109. Kurt Hanson et al., A Guide to Preparing for Tomorrow's "Day of Silence", RAIN:
RADIO AND INTERNET NEWSLETTER, June 25, 2007, http://kurthanson.com/archive/news/
062507/index.shtml. For a full list of participating webcasters, see Press Release, The Sounds
of Silence Will Be Heard by Millions: National Day of Silence for U.S. Webcasters to Be Held
in Protest of Fee Hikes, SAVE NET RADIO.COM, June 25, 2007, http://www.savenetradio.org/
press room/press releases/070625-snr-dos.pdf.
110. See David Oxenford, Motions for Rehearing of Copyright Royalty Decision Filed-
And the Foundation of that Decision Is Challenged, BROADCAST LAW BLOG, Mar. 20, 2007,
http://www.broadcastlawblog.con/archives/intemet-radio-motions-for-reheaing-of-copyight-
royalty-decision-filed-and-the-foundation-of-that-decision-is-challenged.html.
Ill. See In re Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Re-
cordings, No. 2005-1 CRB DTRA, Apr. 16. 2007, available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/fedreg/
2007/order.denying-motions rehearing.pdf.
112. Id. at * 1-2.
113. Id. at *3.
114. Id. at *4. Per ATH rebroadcasts of terrestrial broadcasters was set as 0.0092 cents
(2006) and 0.0127 cents (2007), and for non-music programming at 0.11 cents (2006) and
0.14 cents (2007). Id.
115. In re Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Records,
Final Determination of Rates and Terms, No. 2005-1 CRB DTRA (Apr. 23, 2007), available
at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005- I/final-rates-terms2005-1 .pdf.
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nation adopting these rates and terms."' 16 This delayed the date of first
payment until July 15, 2007."'
K. Internet Radio Equality Act
In response to the CRB decision, webcasting fans sent thousands of
emails and faxes and made phone calls to their representatives and sena-
tors. Senator Diane Feinstein received 25,000 emails, while the office of
Representative Jay Inslee received correspondence equal to that on the
Iraq War."" In response to their constituents' concerns, Representatives
Inslee and Don Manzullo drafted H.R. 2060 and Senators Sam Brown-
back and Ron Wyden sponsored companion legislation in the Senate, S.
1353." 9
The House bill, introduced on April 26, 2007, would nullify the
CRB rate-setting decision.2 Instead of determining the rates for the
compulsory license through a hypothetical marketplace, the bill would
adopt rate-setting based on the provisions in 17 U.S.C. §801(b)(1).' 2'
Section 801(b) has the following objectives:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public.
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return on his or her crea-
tive work and the copyright user a fair income under existing
economic conditions.
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the
copyright user in the product made available to the public
with respect to relative creative contribution, technological
contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to
the opening of new markets for creative expression and media
for their communications.
(D) To minimize any disruptive effect on the structure of the in-
dustries involved and on generally prevailing industry
• 122
practices.
116. Id. at *114.
117. David Oxenfeld, Final Decision of the CRB Issued--and Royalty Due Date Is Post-
poned, BROADCAST LAW BLOG, May 1, 2007, available at http://www.broadcastlawblog.comI
archives/cat-intemet-radio.html.
118. Stephanie Clifford, Pandora's Long Strange Trip: Online Radio That's Cool, Addic-
tive, Free, and-Just Maybe--a Lasting Business, INC.COM, Oct. 2007, http://www.inc.com/
magazine/20071001/pandoras-long-strange-trip.html.
119. See H.R. 2060, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1353, 110th Cong. (2007).
120. Id. §2.
121. Id. § 3(a).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2006).
Fall 20081
284 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:267
The House bill also establishes a transitionary statutory rate for web-
casters; they may choose to pay either 0.33 cents per hour of sound
recordings per listener or 7.5 percent of their total revenues to SoundEx-
change.2 3 The bill also calls for informational reports from various
entities about the state of the Internet radio market.'
24
The Senate bill, introduced two weeks later, is very similar. How-
ever, it does not require informational reports, and declares that any
royalty rates already paid under the current CRB rates should be credited
towards the webcaster's royalty bill.'25
L. Ongoing Litigation
On May 31, 2007, a coalition of webcasters filed for a stay of the
CRB decision pending its appeal by webcasters in the D.C. Circuit.
2 6
Webcasters claimed that the $500 minimum fee per channel was exces-
sive and unnecessary; CRB's rationale for the minimum fee was to cover
the administrative costs of SoundExchange.'2 7 The implementation of the
$500 minimum fee would result in over $1 billion for SoundExchange;
however, it would only collect $18 million in royalty payments for
2006.28 Additionally, almost all parties appealed the CRB decision.'29 On
July 12, 2007, the D.C. Circuit denied the webcasters' emergency stay,
seeking to prevent the July 15th implementation of the CRB royalty
rates. 130
In August 2007, the Digital Media Association, representing the
largest webcasters, came to a settlement agreement with SoundExchange
to cap the $500 minimum per channel at $50,000 per webcaster. "' This
settlement allowed broadcasters like Pandora, for whom each user has at
123. H.R. 2060, 110th Cong. § 3(b) (2007).
124. See id. §§ 5-7.
125. S. 1353, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007).
126. See Motion of Appellants Digital Media Ass'n ("DiMA"), Nat'l Public Radio, Inc.,
Accuradio, LLC, Digitally Imported, Inc., Radioio.com LLC, and Radio Paradise, Inc., for a
Stay Pending Appeal, Digital Media Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Bd. (D.C. Cir. May 31,
2007), available at http://www.savenetradio.org/20070531175931.pdf.
127. Id. at*11.
128. Id.
129. David Oxenfeld, NAB Joins the Fray on Internet Radio-Appeals and a Request for
Stay Are Filed, And a Settlement Offer is Made to Noncommercial Webcasters, BROADCAST
LAW BLOG, June 4, 2007, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/intemet-radio-nab-
joins-the-fray-on-internet-radio-appeas-and-a-request-for-stay-are-filed-and-a-settlement-
offer-is-made-to-noncommercial-webcasters.html.
130. David Oxenfeld, Court Denies Webcaster Stay, BROADCAST LAW BLOG,
July 12, 2007, http://www.broadcastlawblog.conarchives/internet-radio-court-denies-
webcaster-stay.html.
131. David Oxenfeld, Congress to Return-Will Internet Royalties Be on Its Agenda,
BROADCAST LAW BLOG, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.broadcasilawblog.com/archives/internet-
radio-congress-to-retum-will-intemet-radio-royalties-be-on-its-agenda.html.
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least one, if not several, separate streams of music, from going bankrupt
due to minimum fees alone.'
32
In late 2007, a settlement was reached for preexisting subscription
services, which are fee-based and transmitting on or before July 31,
1998. '3 Currently, there is only one service still in existence from that
time: Music Choice." *Music Choice and SoundExchange settled on
royalty rates of 7.25 percent of revenue for 2008 to 2011, and 7.5 percent
for 2012 with a minimum payment of $100,000 due at the beginning of
each year.1
3 5
On March 10, 2008, four separate appeals briefs were submitted to
the D.C. Circuit Court. The brief of the large and small webcasters, rep-
resented by the Digital Media Association (DiMA), urged the court to
adopt the $50,000 cap on the $500 minimum fee per channel that had
been agreed upon in a settlement between DiMA and SoundExchange.'
3 6
DiMA argued for the court to overturn CRB's per-performance royalty
standard, and found that the "willing buyer, willing seller" rates were
ruinously high, and would never have been agreed to by a willing
buyer.' 37 DiMA claimed that the CRB adoption of a per-performance
royalty for small webcasters was "arbitrary and capricious" and con-
flicted with CRB's use of a percentage-of-revenue approach used for
satellite digital audio radio services. '
Simulcasters, commercial broadcasters who simultaneously stream,
filed a brief arguing that the per-performance, per-listener royalty was
unlawful as applied to them. 39 The simulcasters had four main
arguments for this claim: (1) interactive services are not comparable to
non-interactive services, and so even if a per-performance royalty was
appropriate for interactive services, it was not appropriate for non-
interactive services; (2) the CRB's decision was arbitrary and failed to
consider relevant evidence; (3) an inappropriate mathematical model was
132. See id.; see also Pandora, supra note 105.
133. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, § 405(a)(4), 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(11) (1998).
134. David Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Asks for Comment on Music Choice




136. DiMA brief at *14, Intercollegiate Broadcast Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Board, Nos.
07-1123, 07-1168, 07-1172, 07-1173, 07-1174, 07-1177, 07-1178, 07-1179 (D.C. Cir. Mar.
10, 2008), available at http://www.ibsradio.org/6DiMAOpeningbrief.pdf.
137. Id. at "14-15.
138. Id. at *16.
139. Brief at *2, Intercollegiate Broadcast Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Board, Nos. 07-
1123, 07-1168, 07-1172, 07-1173, 07-1174, 07-1177, 07-1178, 07-1179 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10,
2008), available at http://www.ibsradio.org/6-Bonnevilie.NRBMLC.NABbrief.pdf.
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used to calculate rates; and (4) the CRB failed to consider the
simulcasters' arguments for an aggregate tuning hours (ATH) model.' 40
Noncommercial webcasters, which include college broadcasters,
NPR, and noncommercial religious broadcasters,'4 ' are protesting the
CRB's rate structure as well.'4 2 While Congress encouraged the CRB to
consider voluntary agreements, the CRB rejected the agreement prof-
fered by the noncommercial broadcasters. 43 While the noncommercial
broadcasters claim that the evidence demonstrates that only a flat fee
arrangement is appropriate for noncommercial broadcasters, they claim
that the "Board arbitrarily assumed noncommercial services compete
against commercial services, based on audience size alone, and assigned
the same rates to them."'" They also claim that it is disproportionately
burdensome for noncommercial webcasters to face the same recordkeep-
ing requirements as other services. 
4
1
Royalty Logic also submitted a brief to the D.C. Circuit. It chal-
lenges the choice of SoundExchange as the sole common agent for
royalties, and seeks to become an alternative agent.'
46
M. Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008
The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, sponsored by Representative
Jay Inslee (D-WA), was approved by the House on September 28, 2008
and by the Senate on September 30, 2008, and was signed into law on
October 16, 2008.147 The bill amends the Small Webcasters Settlement Act
of 2002, 48 and seeks to adopt a simplified process for settlements between
commercial and noncommercial webcasters with SoundExchange.'" 9 The
140. Id. at *3.
141. See David Oxenfeld, A Year After the Webcasting Royalty Decision-No
Settlement, Appeals Briefs Filed, BROADCAST LAW BLOG, Mar. 15, 2008, http://
www.broadcastlawblog.com/ archives/internet-radio-a-year-after-the-webcasting-royalty-
decision-no-settlement-appeal-briefs-filed.html.
142. See Brief, Intercollegiate Broadcasting Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Board, Nos. 07-
1123, 07-1168, 07-1172, 07-1173, 07-1174, 07-1177, 07-1178, 07-1179 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10,
2008), available at http://www.ibsradio.org/6-Joint-NoncommBriefMarch2008.pdf
143. Id. at *1 1-12.
144. Id. at* 12.
145. Id.
146. See Brief, Intercollegiate Broadcast Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Board, Nos. 07-
1123, 07-1168, 07-1172, 07-1173, 07-1174, 07-1177, 07-1178, 07-1179 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10,
2008), available at http://www.ibsradio.org/6-RoyaltyLogicBriefMarch2008.pdf.
147. Library of Congress, H.R. 7084, "Major Congressional Actions" (Oct. 16, 2008),
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl10:HR07084:@@@R (last visited Feb. 28,
2009).
148. Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, 110th Cong., Pub. L. 110-435, § 2(4) (2008).
149. See David Oxenford, Analysis: Webcaster Settlement Act-What Does It Mean?,
DIGITAL MEDIA WIRE, Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.dmwmedia.comnews/2008/10/03/analysis:-
webcaster-settlement-act-what-does-it-mean%3F.
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law appears to allow settlements to overcome the March 2007 CRB
decision.
°50
While "this legislation is not the final answer ... it is an essential
step toward a lasting and much-needed solution."5 ' However, it could
potentially alleviate disputes until 2015. '52 On November 16, 2008, the
Webcaster Settlement Act was signed into law.'" This means that the
parties have until early 2009 to enter into a settlement agreement without
any further government approvals.'- As of the writing of this Note,
February 4, 2009 has been set as the date for interested parties to file a
Petition to Participate in the proceedings.'
55
IV. How SHOULD WEBCASTERS BE REGULATED?
Royalty rate-setting is currently a royal(ty) mess. Congress reacts in-
crementally to changes in technology and the nature of the music
industry, rather than setting out firm, flexible guidelines for the longer
term. However, that is not to say that the entire system must be thrown
out. Using the existing framework, webcasting should be regulated under
three different metrics: first, non-interactive webcasting should qualify
for a limited public performance right; second, limited interactive web-
casting should have a limited statutory license;'56 and third, fully
interactive and limited and permanent downloading sites should not
qualify for either a limited public performance right or a compulsory li-
cense. By regulating in accordance with the amount of interactivity and
downloading available, this model can adapt to new technologies and
changes in the music industry, while preserving the interests of webcasters
150. Id.
15 I. Senate Approves Webcaster Settelnent Act: Solution for Webcasters May Be Near-
ing, SAVE NET RADIO, Oct. 1, 2008, available at http://www.savenetradio.org/latestnews/08-
10-Ol.html.
152. Id.
153. 154 CONG. REC. D1275 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2008) (H.R. 7084 signed into law).
154. See David Oxenford, Is a Settlement on Internet Radio Royalties Near? Will All
Webcasters Be Included and Will They Be Able to Afford It?, BROADCAST LAW BLOG,
Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/intemet-radio-is-a-settlement-
on-internet-radio-royal ties-near-wiII-all-webcasters-be-incuded-and-wiII-they-be-abe-to-
afford-it.html.
155. Digital Performance in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 74 Fed. Reg.
318-19 (Jan. 5, 2009).
156. For an understanding of how individual webcasters qualify for a statutory license
under the current system, see Cydney A. Tune, Communications Broadcast Advisory: Licens-
ing and Royalty Basics for "Broadcasting" Music Over the Internet, PRACTICING LAW INST.
115, 117-20 (Dec. 2006).
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and other music providers, as well as the interests of the copyright
holders.""
The music industry's main argument for maintaining a separate
system of royalties for webcasters is that webcasting has decreased re-
cord sales.5-8 However, changing consumer habits are a more likely
culprit-record sales have been decreasing for years.' 59 Additionally,
rampant illegal downloading continues despite the prevalence of legal
downloading sites like iTunes and MP3.com.' 6 Compared to illegal
downloading, webcasting represents a way for copyright holders to be
paid at least some royalty fees. Thus, instead of trying to raise copyright
royalties to the point that most webcasters are pushed out of business,
the music industry should change its own model. This battle between
webcasters and the RIAA mirrors the battles in the 1920s and 1930s be-
tween the major record labels and radio, the 1950s disputes between the
movie industry and television, and the conflicts between cable and
157. Six factors which may be considered include:
To make this determination, the CRB should consider: (1) the revenue derived from
the use of copyrighted works; (2) webcasters' individual business models, including
their commercial motives; (3) the level at which individual webcasters reach the
public; and (4) the volume of use of copyrighted works. Additionally, the two statu-
tory factors set forth in § 114(f)(2)(B)-whether the use of the copyrighted work
stimulates or hinders sale of the work, and the relative roles of the copyright owner
and user in terms of risk, creative and technological contribution, and investment-
should be analyzed in conjunction with the previous four factors. These six factors
certainly will overlap, and none should be determinative. The CRB should analyze
each factor in the context of the others and weight the factors on a case-by-case ba-
sis as the CRB deems appropriate.
Mark D. Robertson, Sparing Internet Radio from the Real Threat of the Marketplace, 10
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 548-49 (2008).
158. See CARP Decision, supra note 5 at 33-34, 74-75; see also DANIEL CASTRO, ITIF,
INTERNET RADIO AND COPYRIGHT ROYALTIES: REFORMING A BROKEN SYSTEM 7 (May 2007),
http://www.itif.org/files/IntemetRadio.pdf.
159. While record sales may be decreasing, "[olverall purchases of music in the US
increased 10.5 percent year-over-year since 2007 .... " Jacqui Cheng, Music Sales up 10%
in 2008, Thanks to Dowloads (and Vinyl): Music Sales in the US Grew 10.5 Percent Overall
During 2008, with Online Single-Track Sales Growing by 27 Percent, ARS TECHNICA, Jan.
2, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/0I/music-sales-up-I0-in-2008-thanks-to-
downtoads-and-vinyl.ars. However, "the trends toward digital singles continues to hurt full
CD album sales [which include LPs, CDs, and online albums]... " ld.
160. See Rajiv K. Sinha & Naomi Mandel, Preventing Music Piracy: The Carrot or the
Stick?, 72 J. MARKETING I (2008) ("However, the success of iTunes and other legal file-
sharing Web sites seems to indicate that though many consumers pirate their music, a portion
of music consumers are willing to pay a positive amount to download music legally.").
See also Legal Downloads Swamped by Piracy: Ninety-Five Per Cent of Music Downloaded
Online is Illegal, a Report by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
(IFPI) Has Said, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2009, http:l/news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/technology/
7832396.stm ("The IFPI, which represents 1,400 companies in 72 countries, estimated more
than 40 billion music files were illegally shared in 2008.").
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broadcasts television from the 1960s through the 1980s.' 6' Just as the
entertainment industry has been forced to adapt due to technological
changes, so too should the music industry adjust to webcasting. In fact,
data indicate that webcast listeners are more likely to purchase music
online than satellite radio subscribers. 2 This is a further sign that the
music industry's fears maybe overblown.
It has been suggested that the music industry is punishing web-
casters with higher royalty rates because it is less able to control them
than terrestrial radio broadcasters.' Terrestrial radio is a powerful and
programmable medium that can be used to create hits by playing songs
frequently enough and with enough promotion.' 64 However, because fans
can control music selections at most online radio websites to a far
greater degree than with terrestrial radio, industry marketing campaigns
are less successful.' 65 However, online radio provides a unique way to
enhance customer satisfaction because it allows listeners to hear the
songs, in full, before linking to a site to purchase that song.66
A. Terrestrial Radio, Radio Rebroadcasts,
and Non-Interactive Webcasts
Terrestrial radio, radio retransmissions, and non-interactive web-
casts'67 are all competing technologies. To listen to music, a person either
spins the dial on a radio or types in a web address. The result is the
same-a person tunes into the station in the middle of a song and cannot
161. See Louisa Ha & Richard Ganahl, Lessons From Leading Webcasters Around the
World and the Outlook of Webcasting as an Emerging Global Medium, in WEBCASTING
WORLDWIDE: BUSINESS MODELS OF AN EMERGING GLOBAL MEDIUM 409 (Louisa Ha & Rich-
ard Ganahl, eds., 2006).
162. See Edison Research, supra note 2. And since most music sales are made online,
see Cheng, supra note 159 (out of the more than 1.5 billion songs sold in 2008, "[o]ne billion
digital tracks were sold online"), this represents a significant amount of royalty payments.
163. See, e.g., Paul Maloney, RAIN 11/17: Music Industry Punishing Potential Partner
Says Hanson, RAIN: RADIO & INTERNET NEWSLETTER, http://textpattem.kurthanson.com/
articles/535/rain-l 117-music-industry-punishing-potential-partner-says-hanson ("Yet, as web-
casters insist, the punishing sound recording royalty rate the music industry supports will kill
the Internet music industry .... "); Elliot Van Buskirk, Webcasting Royalties: A Modest Pro-
posal, WIRED.COM, July 7, 2007, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/commentary/
listeningpost/2007/07/listeningpost_0723 ("So it is proposed to punish net radio with unique
and exorbitantly high royalties."); Robertson, supra note 157, at 547-548 ("[u]nfortunately,
the willing buyer/willing seller standard yielded royalty rates that will punish successful web-
casters, limit industry growth, and stifle new-media innovation") (internal citations omitted).
164. See supra Part II.
165. For example, at Pandora, listeners can switch between stations an indefinite number
of times, and may skip a song up to six times per hour. See Posting of Tom Conrad, Chief
Technology Officer, Pandora, to http:/Iblog.pandora.conpandora/archives/2006/06/pandora-
server.html (June 10, 2006, 10:00 AM).
166. See, e.g., id.
167. E.g., Radio Paradise, www.radioparadise.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
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pause, rewind, or skip songs. Both allow for listener requests, but not to
the extent of more interactive webcasters.' 68 All of these formats pay the
industry groups (ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC) royalties for sound re-
cordings; however, only the Internet-based formats must also pay
performance rights to SoundExchange.'
69
By treating these technologies differently, the Copyright Act violates
the new economy principle that policies be technology-neutral.' 70 Since
these different formats have equivalent designs and restrictions, they
should all be subject to the same royalty rates so that they can compete
with each other on the same terms. Although they fill different niches
(terrestrial radio tends plays more mainstream music, whereas web-
casters tend to play more independent music), these are merely different
parts of the same market. Since their broadcasting formats follow the
same restrictions, they should be treated as equivalents by Congress.
B. Limited Interactive Webcasting
and Satellite Radio
The DMCA includes both preexisting satellite digital audio services
and eligible non-subscription services under the statutory license
scheme.'7 1 While most webcasters are included under the latter category,
preexisting subscription services are fee-based and were transmitting on
or before July 31, 1998.172 Currently, there is only one service still in ex-
istence from that time: Music Choice. 73  Music Choice and
SoundExchange settled in late 2007 on royalty rates of 7.25 percent of
revenue for 2008-2011 and 7.5 percent for 2012 with a minimum pay-
ment of $100,000 due at the beginning of each year.17 4
Satellite radio stations pay between six and eight percent of revenue
in royalties.75 In the CRB satellite rate-setting procedure, SoundEx-
change's main goal was to remedy the lack of proportionality between
168. See, e.g., Why Doesn't RP Play my Request?, Radio Paradise, http://
www.radioparadise.com/content.php?name=FAQ (last visited Feb. 29, 2009).
169. See, e.g., How Do Artists You Play Get Paid?, Radio Paradise, http://
www.radioparadise.comlcontent.php?name=FAQ (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
170. See CASTRO, supra note 158, at 1.
171. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, § 405(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2860, 2890-95.
172. Id. at 2899.
173. David Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Asks for Comment on Music Choice




175. In re Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and
Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, Report of the Copyright Royalty Board, No. 2006-1
CRB DSTRA, at 70, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-1/
rates-terms-2006- I.pdf.
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total listening audience and the number of broadcasts.' 76 SoundExchange
recognized that a per-broadcast mechanism did not have the same bene-
fits as the per performance mechanism does for webcasting, and found
that a revenue-based metric was preferable for satellite radio.'7 7 However,
the CRB's decision to implement a revenue-based structure was due to
the lack of evidence before it on the feasibility of a per broadcast mecha-
nism; it was not based on any specific benefit of the per revenue model
for satellite radio or the higher administrative costs of a per broadcast
system.7 8 Despite revenue serving a proxy for the actual value of the
rights used, a critical basis for the CRB's decision to reject a revenue
model for webcasters, the CRB approved this model for satellite radio.'79
The reason given for this distinction is the difficulty of determining ac-
tual revenue for non-subscription webcasters, as compared to the relative
ease for subscription-based satellite radio calculations.' 80
While difficulties in calculating revenue are certainly a valid con-
cern, this should not be the dominant reason why satellite radio stations
pay royalties according to a revenue-based model and webcasters must
pay according to a performance-based model. The revenue-based model
presumes that most services will survive; the current per performance
rates do not.'8 ' While most webcasters do not charge subscription fees,
many webcasters make sufficient revenue through advertising, dona-
tions, and commissions from online music stores who are directed from
the webcaster's site to overcome the fear that webcasters will benefit
from royalties without paying (enough) for them.
Due to the similar royalty structures of Music Choice and satellite ra-
dio, a revenue model should be applied to webcasters who provide limited
interactivity as well.'82 Since all three media use CRB-set compulsory li-
censes or negotiate directly with SoundExchange, they should be treated
the same. Given that SoundExchange, the representative of the copyright
176. Id. at 21.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 26.
179. Compare id. at 22, with Part II1.H.
180. Id. at 27.
181. See CARP Decision, supra note 5, at 52.
182. Interactive webcasting allows users to tailor their listening experience by inputting
preferences, skipping songs, and pausing music; however, listeners cannot replay music,
choose to listen to specific songs, or download the streams. Thus, it does not fall into DMCA's
definition of interactive services. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7) ("The ability of individuals to
request that particular sound recordings be performed for reception of the public at large ...
does not make a service interactive, if the programming on each channel of each service does
not substantially consist of sound recordings that are performed within one hour of the request
.."). For example, Pandora allows users to input a particular song to create a channel, but the
songs played afterwards are not chosen by the listener, who may skip or approve of a song to
shape future listening, but may not choose the next song. See Pandora, supra note 105.
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holders of sound recordings, agreed to a revenue-based royalty model for
a service very similar to most satellite and interactive webcasters, it ap-
pears that SoundExchange may not be as inflexible as it claims to be in
allowing revenue-based royalty models. Thus, the per-revenue model
should be used across the board due to this previously evidenced flexi-
bility on the part of SoundExchange and the preferences of webcasters.
This model is also analogous to that envisioned by SWSA and, de-
spite SWSA's explicitly non-precedential language, the Act serves as a
good indication of Congress' views on this issue. The Music Choice and
satellite radio rate structures are equivalents, and this structure could eas-
ily be adapted to the unique features of webcasting.'83 The Webcaster
Settlement Act of 2008 provides for SoundExchange to enter into a vol-
untary agreement with webcasters without any further governmental
approvals, and this possibility is currently available under current law as
an alternative to the statutory rate.'8
Satellite radio and services like Music Choice are regulated under 17
U.S.C. § 111, while webcasters are regulated under 17 U.S.C. § 114.
While royalties for Section 114 services are regulated under the "willing
buyer, willing seller" model,'8 rate-setting under Section 1 11 may con-
sider a much broacher range of factors: the fair return to the copyright
holder, maximization of the availability of copyrighted works to the pub-
lic, stability in the music industry by minimizing the disruptive impact of
royalty charged, and the relative roles and contribution of parties in
bringing copyrighted materials to the public. 86 However, since there are
minimal differences between interactive webcasters and satellite radio,
this indicates that the legislative standards should be the same for both
types of media.
While SoundExchange's concerns remain about webcasters who
make very little revenue, and thus would pay insufficient royalties, the
Music Choice agreement marks a compromise point. A well-run web-
caster brings in 1.0 to 1.2 cents per listener hour; given that 33 million
Americans listen to online music each month and 46 percent of Ameri-
cans have listened to music online at least once,"7 SoundExchange is not
left without any revenue upon which to extract royalties. SoundEx-
change can also base royalties based on revenue from subscribers' fees
183. This structure is quite similar to the proposed "Internet Radio Equality Act." See
supra Part 111.K.
184. David Oxenford, Is a Settlement on Internet Radio Royalties Near? Will All Web-
casters Be Included and Will They Be Able to Afford It?, BROADCAST LAW BLOG, Nov. 17,
2008, http://www.broadcastlawblog.corm/archives/intemet-radio-is-a-settlement-on-intemet-
radio-royalties-near-will-all-webcasters-be-included-and-will-they-be-able-to-afford-it.html.
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2006).
186. See Oxenford, supra note 173. See also 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1).
187. See Edison Research, supra note 2.
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(if applicable). The CRB has already come up with a compromise for
small webcasters, based on aggregate tuning hours.'88 To further assuage
SoundExchange's concerns, a minimum fee, similar to that negotiated in
the Music Choice agreement, could be implemented.
Lastly, the reason why Music Choice gets preferential treatment is
because it is the only webcaster to survive from the early, pre-DMCA,
days of webcasting.'89 However, the continuing rationale for giving pref-
erential treatment to one webcaster over all others is not quite clear. The
music industry is dominated by innovation-what is popular today rarely
remains popular tomorrow. By treating Music Choice and other web-
casters the same, much of the current discontent by other webcasters
may be alleviated.
C. Subscriptions, Limited Downloads and Permanent Downloads
Currently, limited download sites (such as Rhapsody or Napster) and
permanent download sites (such as iTunes, MP3.com) must individually
negotiate with holders of copyrights in sound recordings.' 9° Limited
download sites allow unlimited downloading for free, but the songs are
only accessible by logging into the site and only so long as the user con-
tinues to pay the subscription fee.' 9' Permanent download sites allow the
user to pay per song or per album to permanently own a copy of the
song.
Since permanent downloading is the equivalent of selling of physical
CD and in direct competition with the record companies, it is logical that
there would be no limited public performance right or compulsory li-
cense. It is clear exactly which sound recordings are bought; the
individual copyright holder should be directly compensated.
While it can be argued that limited download sites should be treated
more like interactive webcasters than the permanent download sites, the
stronger argument goes in the opposite direction. Limited download sites
allow subscribers to treat the music on those sites as if they own it, if
only for a time. Subscribers may replay music and choose exactly which
songs they wish to hear, the prohibition of which is the major limitation
on the public performance right and compulsory license. While sub-
scribers cannot keep the music forever (unless they continue to pay the
subscription fees forever), the arguments are stronger for treating limited
188. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Records, 72 Fed.
Reg. 24,084, 24,099-24,100 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
189. See Oxenford, supra note 134.
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
191. See, e.g., Offer Terms, http://rhapsody.sirris.com/b/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
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download sites like permanent download sites than like interactive web-
casters.
D. Other Proposals for Change
Many webcasters play predominantly independent, or "indie," mu-
sic.' 92 This is music from artists who are not (yet, if ever) signed to major
music labels, and music which is generally not played by terrestrial
broadcasters. For example, the webcaster Pandora gives listeners access
to over 39,000 performers; terrestrial radio plays fewer than three hun-
dred different artists.'93 Many (if not most) indie artists allow their music
to be played or downloaded for free in order to get the exposure;'94 how-
ever, SoundExchange will not allow webcasters to stream their music for
free.' 95 Instead, these indie musicians must go through the same royalty
system as major label artists. 96 The perspective of one indie band on this
system is a focus on exposure, rather than royalty payments: "I want the
people to own the music and the artists to own the copyright. Why let a
record company get in the way of the music?"' 97
Some critics suggest that Congress mandate that SoundExchange
and the Copyright Royalty Board create a national database of all sound
recordings and allow individual copyright holders determine the compul-
sory license rate for each of their works at or below a statutory rate.
98
Since SoundExchange already has a database of all sound recordings and
their copyright holders, adding a preferred royalty rate would not be a
huge burden on SoundExchange.' 99
192. See Eric Bangeman, Indies Need Royalties Too: Webcasters Favor Indie Music
Over Major Labels, July 30, 2007, http://arstechnica.comlnews.ars/post120070730-indies-
need-royalties-too-webcasters-favor-indie-music-over-major-labels.html (noting that fifty-six
percent of the music streamed by webcasters comes from independent labels).
193. Brian K. White, Pandora Strikes Back as Web 2.0 Demands, GLOSSY NEWS.COM,
June 16, 2007, http://www.glossynews.com/artman/publish/pandora- 1415.shtml.
194. See, e.g., www.myspace.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2009); www.youtube.com (last
visited Feb. 28, 2009).
195. While not a struggling "indie" band, the recent example of Radiohead providing their
album to consumers "paying as little or as much as they chose." This included paying nothing.
Radiohead Generation Believes Music Is Free, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 22, 2008, available
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/281723 I/Radiohead-generation-believes-music-
is-ree.html.
196. See Jason Lee Miller, Most Web Music Indie, But Stations Still Pay, WEB PRO
NEWS, July 30, 2007, http://www.webpronews.comltopnews/2007/07/30/most-web-music-
indie-but-stations-still-pay.
197. Radiohead Generation Believes Music Is Free, supra note 195.
198. See Castro, supra note 158, at 9-10.
199. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The current system for calculating royalties is a mess. The CRB de-
cision is likely to put all but the strongest webcasters out of business
unless judicial, legislative, or voluntary measures are successful. This
elimination of so many businesses is not in the best interest of society or
the music industry. Society benefits from having a wide variety of music
available, stimulating the marketplace of music and ideas. The music
industry can benefit as well, by taking advantage of the unique aspects of
webcasting to promote their products. While this may mean lower profits
for the copyright holders in the short-term (through lower royalty rates),
it helps ensure the long-term existence of the music industry through the
realization that music promotion and sales occur through a variety of
media, including webcasting. One way to ensure the continued existence
of webcasting is through accepting lower royalty rates and encouraging
webcasters to stay legal and in the United States.
